# United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit



**APPENDIX** 

# 75-1307

MICHAEL YOUNG

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

-against-


MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN,

Appellant.

Docket No. 75-1309

APPENDIX TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



WILLIAM J. GALLAGHER, ESQ., THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, Attorney for Appellant MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN PEDERAL DEFENDER SERVICES UNIT 509 United States Court House Foley Square New York, New York 10007 (212) 732-2971

MICHAEL YOUNG, SHEILA GINSBERG, Of Counsel.

PAGINATION AS IN ORIGINAL COPY

TITLE O	F CASE				ATTORNEYS			
THE UNITED S		S		For U. S.:				
	JIMIE			S. Andrew Schaffer, AUSA.				
MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN				791-1917				
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				For Defendant	•	4 1 4 1		
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3:970 Attempted injury to pro	ner	v of an	inter. orga	nization.(C	: 3)			
8:844(d) Interstate transp.	f ex	plosive	s.(Ct.4)					
8:844(d) Interstate transp.	1	PIOSITO	(Four	Counts)				
3:371 Conspiracy so to do.(C			PROCEEDINGS					
DATE								
1-14-74 Filed indictment. (R	elate	ed to 74	Cr853 and as	ssigned to	Pierce,J.	<del>)</del>		
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11-27-74 Filed Covt's. memorandum	of la	w in sup	BOLL OI MUNICIPAL					
11-25-74 Deft. (atty. present) ple	ads no	ot guilty	to each count	. Trial begi	ne with a	jury.		
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cash remains the same.	Deft	. contin	ued remanded	Pierce,	•			

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DATE	PROCEEDINGS	PLAINT	IFF	DEFEND	AN
1-15-75	Filed JUDGMENT and COMMITMENT (atty present) It is adjudged that t	ne defi	, is		
	hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney General or his a	thori	ed		
	representative for imprisonment for the maximum period authorize	d by 14	w, t	0	
	wit, TEN(10)YEARS on count 2, TEN (10) YEARS on count 4 and FIVE	(5) YI	ARS	on	
	count 3 to run CONSECUTIVELY to each other, and for a study as d	escribe	d in		
	Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 4208(c), the results of such study		MODE TO ACT VILLE	Mark State State of the State o	
	to this Court within three(3) months, unless the Court grants fu				_
	to exceed three(3) months, whereupon the deft. shall be returned				_
	and the sentence of imprisonment herein imposed shall be subject		ENGLISHED ST		_
	in accordance with Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 4208(b). Deft.				_
	Pierce,J.				_
•	Issued commitment 1-17-75.				_
1-28-75	Filed commitment & entered return. Deft. delivered to Warden, Fed	eral D	eten	ion	
	Headquarters, N.Y.C. on 1-15-75.				
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4-17-75	Filed JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT (atty present) The Court adjudged the	e deft	gui	lty as	
4-1/-/2	charged and convicted and having on 1-15-75 been committed to the		CONTROL NO DE LA COLOR		1
	Attorney General or his authorized representative pursuant to Ti				-
	4208(b), U.S. Code for imprisonment for a term of TEN (10) YEARS				-
	FIVE (5) YEARS on count 3 and TEN (10) YEARS on count 4, (the many			1	-
	run CONSECUTIVELY to each other, and for a study as described in			•	1
	of Title 18, U.S. Code and the deft. having been returned to the				
	Court having now received and considered the report of such students and Adjudged that the period of imprisonment heretofore imposed				
	TEN (10) YEARS on count 2, FIVE (5) YEARS on count 3 and TEN (10		0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000		
	to run concurrently with each other. Pursuant to the provision				
	Section 4208(a)(2), U.S. Code, the deft. shall become eligible				i
	time as the Board of Parole may determine. Deft. is remanded	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	lerc	9,3.	
	Issued commitment 4-18-75.		-	-	1
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4-21-75	Filed Govt's. memorandum of law, re: sufficiency of evidence.	_		-	Contract of the contract of th
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4-24-75	Filed commitment & entered return. Deft. delivered to Warden, Fe	deral	Deter	tion	Contraction of the last
	Headquarters, N.Y.C. on 4-17-75.	-	-	-	Company of the last
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7-22-7	Filed transcript of record of proceedings dated 4-17-75.				Total Section
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DATE PROCEEDINGS  7-24-75 Filed transcript of record of proceedings dated I-18-75.	C. 110 Rev. C	ivil Docket Continuation Page #3
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	and the second	
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### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-v-

INDICTM. NT

MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN,

S 74 Cr.

Defendant.

7 4 CRIM. 1068

The Grand Jury charges:

From on or about the 1st day of January, 1974 and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, the defendant, and others to the Grand Jury unknown, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired, confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Sections 112(a), 970, and 844(d) of Title 18, United States Code.

### OVERT ACTS

In pursuance of the said conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts were committed in the Southern District of New York.

1. On or about August 5, 1974 the defendant, MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, went to 10 West 90th Street, New York, New York.

- 2. On or about August 5, 1974 the defendant,
  MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, registered at a hotel in Manhattan.
- 3. On or about August 6, 1974 the defendant MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN placed a quantity of dynamite on the property of United Nations Headquarters in Manhattan.

(Title 18 United States Code Section 371)

### COUNT TWO

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 6th day of August, 1974 in the Southern District of New York MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, the defendant, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did attempt to assault, wound and offer violence to foreign officials and official guests at the headquarters of the United Nations by the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon.

(Title 18 United States Code Section 112(a))

### COUNT THREE

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 6th day of August, 1974 in the Southern District of New York MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, the defendant, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did attempt to injure, damage and destroy real and personal property located within the United States and belonging to or utilized or occupied by an international organization, foreign officials and official guests.

(Title 18 United States Code Section 970)

### COUNT FOUR

The Grand Jury further charges:

On or about the 5th day of August, 1974 in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere MICHAEL HALSEY BROWN, the defendant, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did transport in interstate commerce an explosive with the knowledge or intent that it would be used to kill, injure, or intimidate one or more individuals or destroy a building, vehicle, or other real or personal property.

(Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(d)).

Joreman Joreman

PAUL J. CURRAN
United States Attorney



# United States District Court

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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MICHAEL HALFEY BROWN,

Defendant.

## INDICTMENT


(in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 112(a), 970 and 844(d).)

PAUL J. CURRAN

United States Attorney.

A TRUE BILL

Leage Angenine Foreman.



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US v Brown 1 74 Cr 1068

J. Pierce

### CHARGE OF THE COURT

THE COURT: Counsel, Madam Forelady, ladies and gentlemen of the jury:

Let me thank you for having demonstrated thus far the qualities of a good jury. You have been punctual, you have been attentive, you have been alert.

Further, we know that in order for you to serve on a jury you must make sacrifices in your lives, and I, on behalf of the court and counsel, wish to thank you for the sacrifices which you have made in order to participate as jurors in the administration of justice.

I also wish to thank the attorneys for their cooperation during this trial. They have represented their respective positions with considerable skill and with obvious serious dedication.

I ask you now to give me the same degree of attention which you have given thus far during this trial so that you might understand the principles of law which are applicable in this case.

First let me point out some general principles as to your duty, as to what you may and may not consider during your deliberations.

It is the judge's function, as I have told you before, to instruct you as to the law which applies in this

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case. It is your duty as jurors to accept the law as I state it to you. It is your duty to apply the law to the facts as you find those facts to be during your deliberations based upon the evidence in this case.

I ask you not to single out any one instruction alone as stating the law but rather to consider the instructions as a whole, and the logical result of your application of the law to the facts as you find those facts to be should be a verdict either of guilty or not guilty.

Now, you are the sole and exclusive judges of the facts. It is you who must pass upon the weight of the evidence; you must determine the credibility of the witnesses you must resolve such conflicts as there may be in the evidence; you draw such reasonable inferences as may be warranted by the testimony and the exhibits in this case.

with respect to any matters of fact, it is your recollection and yours alone which governs. Anything that the attorney for the government or the attorney for the defendant may have said with respect to any matters in evidence or as to any factual matters is not to be substituted for your own independent recollection of the evidence or the facts in this case. Anything which I have said with respect to any matters in evidence or any factual matters is not to be taken by you in lieu ofyour own

recollection.

You are not to assume that I have any opinion as to whether or not this defendant is guilty or not guilty, or as to the truth or the falsity of the charges asserted in the indictment. The fact that I have asked questions from time to time, denied motions or granted motions in the course of this trial is not to be taken by you as any indication that the defendant is believed by this Court to be guilty or not guilty.

Further, the attorneys in this case have the right on the offer of certain evidence to press legal objections, and in doing so they are simply performing their duty.

In your deliberations to determine the facts and whether the government has established the elements of the crimes charged, you are to consider solely the testimony which you have heard from the witnesses, any stipulations of fact which the lawyers have agreed upon, the exhibits which have been received in evidence, and even any lack of any material evidence, but nothing else.

As you approach the performance of your function as jurors in this case, that is, the determination of whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, please remember that it is your duty to weigh the evidence calmly and dispassionately, without sympathy or prejudice for or

against either party. Any defendant appearing before this court is entitled to have a fair and impartial trial regardless of any accidental characteristics or factors such as place of birth or occupation or station in life.

The fact that the government is a party here or that the prosecution occurs in the name of the United States of America entitles it to no greater consideration than that accorded to any other party and, by the same token, the government is entitled to no less consideration. All parties, government and individuals alike, stand equal before the law.

The defendant on trial here has pleaded not guilty to the counts with which he is charged. Consequently, if the defendant is to be convicted the government has the burden of proving each and every element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

The burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt never shifts. It remains upon the government throughout the trial. The law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence, and you may draw no unfavorable inference against the defendant because he did not take the stand and testify.

In addition, you may not speculate as to why the

defendant chose not to testify, nor may you speculate as to what the defendant might have stated had he chosen to testify. In every criminal case there is a constitutional rule which every defendant has the right to rely on. It is the rule that no defendant is compelled to take the witness stand. It is the prosecution which must prove a defendant guilty as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant is not required to disprove anything. He is not required to establish his lack of guilt.

Also, the defendant has no obligation to call any witness on his behalf or offer any evidence whatsoever.

In short, it is up to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crimes charged in the indictment.

The defendant is presumed to be not guilty of the accusations contained in the indictment, and this presumption continues throughout the trial and even during the course of your deliberations in the jury room. So the presumption of innocence is sufficient to acquit a defendant of a crime charged unless it is overcome by evidence that satisfies your minds beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Unless you are so satisfied, it is your sworn obligation to find the defendant not guilty. If you are so satisfied, it is your sworn

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obligation to find the defendant guilty.

And so the question arises what is a reasonable doubt. It is a doubt which a reasonable person has after carefully weighing all the evidence, the kind of a doubt which would make you hesitate to act in the most important affairs of your own life. Reasonable doubt is doubt which appeals to your reason, your judgment, your common sense and your experience. It is not caprice or whim or speculation; it is not an excuse to avoid the performance of an unpleasant duty, nor is it sympathy for any party.

If, after a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence or lack of evidence, you can honestly say that you do not have an abiding belief as to the defendant's guilt, then you have a reasonable doubt and it is your duty to acquit.

On the other hand, if, after a fair and impartial consideration of all the evidence, you can honestly say that you do have an abiding belief as to the defendant's quilt, then you have no reasonable doubt and it is your duty to convict.

A reasonable doubt does not mean positive certainty beyond all possible doubt. The law in a criminal case is that it is sufficient if the guilt of a defendant is established beyond a reasonable doubt, not beyond all

possible doubt.

From time to time you may have heard reference made to direct evidence and to circumstantial evidence. Let me explain the difference between the two.

Direct evidence is where a witness testifies to what he saw, heard or observed, what he knows of his own knowledge, something which comes to the witness by virtue of his senses. That is direct evidence.

Circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts and circumstances from which one may infer connected facts which reasonably follow in the common experience of mankind.

Stated somewhat differently, circumstantial evidence is a fact or a series of facts in evidence which have a logical tendency to lead the mind to a conclusion that another fact exists even though there is no direct evidence to that effect.

Let me give you a simple example. If you should find that you have a mouse running around the kitchen at home coming through a hole alongside a water pipe, if you should plug up the hole that the mouse apparently comes through with steelwool and then if you should leave a box of crackers out on a table in that room and you leave your home for a few hours and then come back and find that the box of crackers which was otherwise intact now has a hole

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in the bottom corner say about an inch in diameter and then you look down at the water pipe and you find that the steelwool which you had stuffed down alongside the pipe has been pushed away, you could conclude that the mouse had come through the hole by the water pipe and reached the box and made a hole in it.

Now, you would arrive at this conclusion not from direct evidence, you did not see it happen, but rather from circumstantial evidence. In other words, you would infer on the basis of reason and experience from one or more established facts the existence of some further fact.

Now, circumstantial evidence, if believed, is of no less value than direct evidence, for in either case you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.

There are times when different inferences may be drawn from the same facts, whether proved by direct or by circumstantial evidence. The government asks you to draw one set of inferences, the defendant another, and it is for you and you alone to decide what reasonable inferences you choose to draw from the evidence in this case.

It is your duty to determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts as you find those

facts to be from the evidence, but you may not indulge in guesswork or speculation.

Some of the evidence adduced by the government was adduced in support of the conspiracy count of the indictment. Some of the same evidence has also been adduced in support of substantive counts, one or more substantive counts, of the indictment. If the evidence relates to and is connected to the conspiracy count and the substantive count, there is nothing inconsistent in using parts of the same evidence to prove that the defendant committed a substantive crime and also to prove that he was a member of the conspiracy.

Now, there are a number of factors which are not evidence in this case and which you may not under any circumstances consider during your deliberations.

First, if during the course of the trial a question was asked and an objection was interposed and if I sustained the objection, you are to disregard the question and any alleged facts contained in that question. If there was an answer to the question, you must disregard the answer.

Similarly, if I ruled that an answer be stricken from the record, you are to disregard the answer and the question in your deliberations. They are not evidence and

therefore cannot be considered by you in any respect.

Also, as I told you at the beginning of the trial, an indictment is not evidence, it is simply a procedure by which persons accused by a grand jury of crimes are brought to trial. Whether the person accused is guilty or not guilty of the crimes charged is determined by a trial jury such as you.

Now, you as jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of witnesses and also of the weight their testimony deserves. You know that there is no automatic way to tell who is telling the truth and who is not. Credibility can be equated with believability. If a witness is credible, you say he is believable.

You should carefully scrutinize all the testimony given both on direct and cross examination and the circumstances under which each witness has testified and every matter in evidence which tends to show whether a witness is worthy of belief. Consider the witness' ability to observe the matters as to which he has testified and whether the witness impresses you as having had an accurate recollection of these matters.

When judging credibility, consider any relation any witness may bear to any side of the case, the manner in which each witness might be affected by the verdict and the

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extent to which, if at all, each witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case.

on the credibility of witnesses is did the witness tell
the truth before you. It is for you to say whether a
witness' testimony at this trial was truthful or untruthful
in whole or in part. If you find that any witness has
wilfully testified falsely as to any material matter, you
may reject the entire testimony of the witness, or you
may accept such portion of it as you believe to be true.

You may recall that during the course of the trial I gave you instructions with respect to certain evidence or testimony presented. Let me repeat those instructions.

As to the newspaper clippings that were received in evidence, I instruct you that they were not offered or received in evidence to demonstrate the truth of what is contained therein. In other words, the words in the clippings were not offered as evidence or proof of what is stated therein to have occurred. These items were rather offered and received in evidence as some evidence to be considered by you on the question of whether or not the crimes charged against the defendant were in fact committed by him.

During the trial there were passages from a

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particular book admitted into evidence. As to this, I again instruct you that they were not received in evidence to demonstrate the truth or accuracy of these passages. For example, they were not received as proof of the formula for thermite. These passages are to be considered by you for whatever bearing, if any, they may have on the state of mind and intent of the defendant here.

Also during the trial there was some testimony concerning statements relating to any similar proposed enterprises on the part of the defendant. that is, the purported plan to saw off statues in Washington, D. C. I caution you that this testimony is not to be considered by you as showing the criminal character or disposition of the defendant as far as the criminal acts charged in this case are concerned. Rather it should be considered by you, if at all, as probative, to whatever extent you deem it so, of the required intent or design on the part of the defendant to commit the offenses with which he is charged.

Now, the rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit witnesses to testify as to their opinions or conclusions. An exception to this rule exists as to those we call expert witnesses.

Witnesses who by education and experience have

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become expert in some science, profession or calling may state their opinions as to relevant and material matter in which they profess to be expert and may also state their reasons for the opinion.

In this case, Mr. James Lile and Mr. Willard Cloyde were presented by the government as handwriting and fingerprint experts, respectively. You should give their testimony such weight as you think it deserves. Should you decide that an expert witness is biased or prejudiced or that the opinion of an expert witness is not based on sufficient education and experience, or should you conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinion are not sound, or should you feel that it is outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely.

Lastly, I should tell you that, as you are well aware, there have been several occasions during the course of this trial for the lawyers to confer with this Court out of your hearing. In such situations, you, the jury, should in no wise feel slighted. You are not to speculate as to what was being discussed. In the interest of justice and to expedite a trial, it is necessary that conferences be held at this bench between counsel and the Court. This further serves to avoid the inconvenience of having the jury constantly file in and file out. It serves further to

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prevent the jury from becoming confused on technical legal matters. 3

In short, such conferences have been held at the bench during the conduct of this case to avoid your having to listen to arguments on questions of law which concerned only counsel and the Court.

New, this completes my general instructions with regard to your duty and function and with regard to what you may or may not consider in your deliberations. I am going to turn now to a discussion of the specific charges against the defendant and instruct you as to the essential elements which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain the charges against the defendant.

If you wish to stretch, however, please take a moment to do so.

(Pause.)

Now, the indictment in this case contains four counts or accusations against the defendant. They break down into one conspiracy count and three substantive counts. I am going to discuss the conspiracy count first.

Count 1 of the indictment charges that the defendant Michael Halsey, Brown, along with others conspired to violate certain federal statutes.

I charge you that a conspiracy to commit a crime

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is a separate offense distinct and apart from the substantive crimes that the conspiracy was allegedly formed to accomplish.

Section 371 of Title 18 of the United States

Code, which makes a conspiracy a crime, a federal crime,

reads in part as follows:

"If two or more persons conspire to commit any offense against the United States and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each is guilty of an offense against the United States."

I will now read to you Count 1 of the indictment in part.

The Grand Jury charges:

From on or about the 1st day of January, 1974, and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment --

What was the date of the filing of the superseding indictment?

MR. SCHAFFER: I believe November 14, your Honor.

THE COURT: -- November 14, 1974, in the Southern

District of New York and elsewhere, Michael Halsey Brown,

the defendant, and others to the Grand Jury unknown,

unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly combined, conspired,

confederated and agreed together and with each other to violate Sections 112(a), 970 and 844(d) of Title 18 of the United States Code.

Now, in order for you to find the defendant guilty of conspiracy as charged in Count 1, the government must establish the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that some time between January 1, 1974, and November 14, 1974, the date the indictment was filed, a conspiracy as charged in the indictment existed between the defendant and at least one other alleged co-conspirator.

Two, that the defendant knowingly and wilfully associated himself with the conspiracy, that is, joined it, aware of its objects.

And three, that the defendant or one of the alleged co-conspirators knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts set forth in the indictment at or about the time and place alleged in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Now I will read those overt acts to you shortly.

As to the first element, what is a conspiracy?

It is a combination or agreement between two or more persons to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means. It has been referred to somewhat loosely as a partnership in crime.

The indictment here charges that the conspiracy had as its object the violation of Section 112(a), Section 970 and Section 844(d) of Title 18 of the United States Code. Thus, the government must prove that it was the purpose of the conspiracy to violate these federal statutes. The first section, 112(a), provides in part that:

"Whoever assaults, strikes, wounds or offers violence to a foreign official or official guest" shall be guilty of a rime.

The next section, 844(d), in general makes it unlawful to transport in interstate commerce an explosive with the knowledge or intent that it will be used to kill, injure or intimidate any individual, or to unlawfully damage any building or other real or personal property.

Finally, Section 970 makes it unlawful to attempt to or actually injure, damage or destroy real or personal property located within the United States and belonging to or utilized or occupied by an international organization, foreign officials and official guests.

Now I am going to define a number of these terms for you so that you will understand what they mean.

Thus, in Count 1 of the indictment, the government is charging that there was an agreement between the defendant and others to accomplish an unlawful purpose, to

wit, the violation of these federal statutes.

Now, I emphasize that it takes two or more persons to form a conspiracy. A person cannot conspire with himself, and so you must first determine whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an agreement between certain individuals to work together to achieve some unlawful purpose.

In this regard, please note that it is not necessary for all of the alleged members of the conspiracy to be charged or to be tried together, nor is it necessary that the identity of all the co-conspirators be known in order to establish the existence of a conspiracy.

However, if you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that there was such an agreement as I have described it to you between two or more persons, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count 1.

It is not necessary, however, for the government to prove that there was any formal agreement or arrangement.

Indeed, it would be extraordinary if there were such. Persons associating together to violate the law are not likely to put their understanding in writing or to make it public.

Thus, it is sufficient if two or more persons in any manner, through any contrivance, impliedly or tacitly, came to a common understanding to violate the law. Express

language or specific words are not required to indicate assent or attachment to a conspiracy. Usually the only evidence available is that of disconnected acts on the part of the alleged individual conspirators.

If, upon consideration of the evidence in this case, direct or circumstantial or both, you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the minds of two or more persons met so as to bring about a deliberate agreement to work together in furtherance of the unlawful enterprise alleged in the indictment, then proof of the existence of the conspiracy is established.

In this connection, it is not necessary for the government to prove the success or the completion of the object or purpose of the conspiracy. As a conspiracy is basically the agreement to violate the law, it may exist even though the final objectives were never accomplished.

A conspiracy, if you find one, once formed is presumed to continue as to each participant until either its purpose has been accomplished or there has been some affirmative act of withdrawal by that participant.

The period of time charged in the indictment runs from on or about January 1, 1974, to November 14 of this year, the date of the filing of the indictment. It is not necessary for the government to prove that the

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE

conspiracy started and ended on these specific dates. It is sufficient if you find that in fact a conspiracy was formed and existed for some substantial time within the period set forth in the indictment.

Now, if you get past step one, that is, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that an unlawful agreement between two or more persons existed here, then step two is to determine whether the defendant became a member of that conspiracy knowingly and wilfully.

An act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident or for other innocent reason.

An act is done wilfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and deliberately and with specific intent to do something which the law forbids, that is to say, to act with the purpose either of disobeying or disregarding the law.

Now, in determining whether the defendant became a member of the conspiracy, you must determine not only whether he participated in it but whether he did so with knowledge of its unlawful purpose. Did he join it with awareness of at least some of the basic aims and purposes of the conspiracy?

Knowledge may be inferred from a person's conduct,

GW31.

from his acts, from his statements and from all the surrounding circumstances. It is not necessary that the defendant
be fully informed as to all of the activities and all of
the actors and details of the scope of the conspiracy in
order to justify the inference of knowledge on his part.

I wish to caution you that mere association with one or more of the conspirators does not make one a member of a conspiracy, nor is knowledge without participation sufficient. What is necessary for you to determine is whether the defendant participated in the conspiracy with knowledge of at least some of its unlawful purposes and with intent to aid in the accomplishment of those unlawful ends. In other words, you may not find the defendant guilty of the first count unless you find that he knowingly and wilfully joined the conspiracy knowing that his acts were a part of the unlawful enterprise.

You will recall that I have previously defined wilfully and knowingly.

Now, if you find that, first, there was a conspiracy and, next, that the defendant was a member of that conspiracy then you reach the third element which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and that is that an overt act to effect the objective of the conspiracy was committed by at least one of the co-conspirators.

Now, an overt act is any step, action or conduct which is taken to achieve or further the objective of the conspiracy. The alleged overt acts set forth in the indictment read as follows. They are three.

"In pursuance of the said conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts were committed in the Southern District of New York:

- "1. On or about August 5, 1974, the defendant, Michael Halsey Brown, went to 10 West 90th Street, New York, New York.
- "2. On or about August 5, 1974, the defendant, Michael Halsey Brown, registered at a hotel in Manhattan.
- "3. On or about August 6, 1974, the defendant,
  Michael Halsey Brown, placed a quantity of dynamite cn
  the property of the United Nations headquarters in Manhattan.

Now, obviously for a person to enter a building or register at a hotel is not in and of itself criminal conduct. However, an overt act need not be in itself a criminal act. It can be any act as long as it is performed in furtherance of the conspiracy.

The government need not prove that all the overt acts alleged in the indictment were performed. It is sufficient if it proves that one of them was performed and that it was done in furtherance of the conspiracy

charged.

Further, it is not necessary that each member of the conspiracy committed or participated in the particular overt act.

The indictment charges that the overt acts were committed in the Southern District of New York, and I instruct you as a matter of law that the County of New York is in the Southern District of New York and the United Nations is in the County of New York.

You may not find the defendant guilty of conspiracy unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant or one of the alleged co-conspirators committed at least one of the overt acts alleged in the indictment on or about the date specified within the Southern District of New York.

Finally, if, upon all the evidence that you believe and consider relevant, you are satisfied that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of the crime of conspiracy, that is, one, that a conspiracy existed; two, that the defendant knowingly and wilfully joined it aware of its objects; and three, one of the overt acts alleged was committed by the defendant or a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy in the Southern District of New York, then you are to return

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a verdict of guilty against the defendant.

If you are not so satisfied, then you are to return a verdict of not guilty on the conspiracy count.

Now, there are three other counts. Count 2 reads as follows:

"The Grand Jury charges:

"On or about the 6th day of August, 1974, in the Southern District of New York, Michael Halsey Brown, the defendant, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did attempt to assault, wound and offer violence to foreign officials and official guests at the headquarters of the United Nations by the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon."

Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 2, you must be convinced that the government has proved the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

- 1. That on or about August 6, 1974, the defendant attempted to assault or wound or offer violence to persons present at the headquarters of the United Nations.
- That such persons were foreign officials or official quests.
- That the defendant did so by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon.
  - That the defendant did so unlawfully, knowingly

GW35

and wilfully.

In order to find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in Count 2, you must first find that he attempted to assault or wound or offer violence to persons present at the headquarters of the United Nations.

To attempt means wilfully to do some act in an effort to bring about or accomplish something the law forbids to be done.

Count 2 charges the defendant with an attempt to assault, wound or offer violence.

An assault is any hostile gesture or threat, coupled with an apparent present ability in the one making the gesture or threat to commit violent physical injury upon another person.

An assault may be committed without actually touching, striking or committing bodily hard to another.

To wound has its common, everyday meaning: To injure or produce bodily harm.

To offer violence means to threaten violence or to create a condition of physical danger.

You are instructed that it is not necessary that the government prove that the defendant attempted to assault, wound and offer violence to officials at the United Nations. It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant attempted to do any one or more of the acts charged, that he attempted to assault or attempted to wound or attempted to offer violence to the persons in question.

In considering this element of the crime, I remind you that the government is not contending that the defendant did actually assault, wound or offer violence to anyone. It merely contends that he attempted to do so.

I instruct you that an attempt to assault, wound or offer violence is just as much a violation of the law as the actual acts.

The government has therefore satisfied the burden of proof as to this element if you find it has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to assault, wound or offer violence to persons at the United Nations.

at the United Nations were foreign officials or official
guests. Congress has defined foreign official as any person
of a foreign nationality who is duly notified to the United
States as an officer or employee of a foreign government
or international organization and who is in the United States
on official business; and Congress has defined an official
guest as a citizen or national of a foreign country present
in the United States as an official guest of the government

**GW37** 

of the United States pursuant to designation as such by the Secretary of State.

In order to convict the defendant of the crime charged in Count 2, you must also find that in attempting to assault, wound or offer violence to foreign officials or official guests, the defendant used a deadly or dangerous weapon.

As to this, I instruct you that a dangerous or deadly weapon may be almost any object which, as used or attempted to be used, may endanger a life or inflict great bodily harm.

You recall that I told you that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully.

Unlawfully of course means contrary to law. So to do an act unlawfully means to do wilfully something which is contrary to law.

I have already defined for you what is meant by
the terms knowingly and wilfully when I instructed you on
the conspiracy count. I told you then that an act is done
knowingly if done voluntarily and intentionally and not
because of mistake or accident or for other innocent reason;
and an act is done wilfully if it is done voluntarily and
intentionally and deliberately and with a bad purpose or

motive.

The government need not establish that the defendant knew he was breaking the law or any particular rule. It must, however, show bad purpose or motive on his part.

In determining whether the defendant knowingly and intentionally committed the offense with which he is charged in Count 2, issues of fact are presented and clearly those issues concern what is in one's mind.

Now let's just sort of take a stretch break here and regain some resiliency.

(Pause.)

box with you the common sense and experience of your daily lives. It is obviously not always possible to ascertain or prove directly what was the operation of the mind or the intention of the defendant. You can't look into his mind to see what his intentions were, but you are able to consider all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence and the exhibits in this case, stipulations, and draw your own conclusions with a reasonable degree of accuracy as to what, if anything, the defendant's intentions were.

Intent involves a mental attitude. From evidence of a particular act, coupled with evidence of surrounding

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circumstances, one may choose to draw certain conclusions.

In other words, proof of the circumstances surrounding a person's actions can supply an adequate basis for a finding that the defendant acted knowingly and wilfully.

Intent can be adequately established by a showing of reckless disregard for the consequences of one's actions.

Now, you will have to determine from the evidence presented in this case what, if anything, was the intention of the defendant.

Now, this completes my instructions with respect to Count 2 of the indictment. To summarize, before you can find the defendant guilty of the offense charged in that count, you must find that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt, one, that on or about August 6, 1974, the defendant attempted to assault or wound or offer violence to persons present at the headquarters of the United Nations; two, that such persons were foreign officials or official guests; three, that the defendant did so by means of a deadly or dangerous weapon; and four, that the defendant did so unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully.

If you find that the government has proven each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must return a verdict of guilty as to this count. If you find that the government has failed to prove each of these

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elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty on this count.

Count 3 of the indictment charges a violation of Section 970 of Title 18 of the United States Code and reads as follows:

"The Grand Jury charges:

"On or about the 6th day of August, 1974, in the Southern District of New York, Michael Halsey Brown, the defendant, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did attempt to injure, damage and destroy real and personal property located within the United States and belonging to or utilized or occupied by an international organization, foreign officials and official guests."

Now, before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in this count, you must be convinced that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements:

- That on or about August 6, 1974, the defendant attempted to injure or destroy property.
- 2. That such property was located in the United States at the United Nations.
- 3. That such property belonged to or was utilized by an international organization, foreign official or official guest.

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4. That the defendant did so unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly.

The first element that you must find beyond a reasonable doubt to have been proven before you can convict the defendant is that the defendant attempted to injure, damage or destroy property. The words "injure, damage or destroy" have their common, everyday meaning. In this context they mean to harm or to do violence to property and to thereby render it unfit for its normal uses, either temporarily or permanently.

In considering this element of the crime, I remind you that the government is not contending that the defendant actually injured, damaged or destroyed anything. It contends that the defendant attempted to do so.

The statute in question, Title 18, United States Code, Section 970, makes an attempt as much a crime as the actual destruction.

The government has therefore satisfied its burden of proof under this element of the crime so long as it has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant attempted to injure, damage or destroy the property in question.

Now, with regard to the second element, there does not appear to be any dispute that the property was located in the United States. Nevertheless, you must find

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beyond a reasonable doubt that the United Nations is property located within the United States and, of course, here in the Southern District of New York, which embraces New

York County, where it is situated.

The third element of Count 3 which you must find. is that the property which the defendant is charged with attempting to damage or to destroy belonged to or was used by an international organization, foreign officials or official guests.

In discussing Count 2, I have already defined foreign officials and official guests for you.

Congress has defined "international organization" as a public international organization in which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any act of Congress authorizing such participation and which shall have been designated by the President through appropriate executive order.

I charge you as a matter of law that the United Nations has been designated an international organization through appropriate executive order.

Finally, if you find that the defendant attempted to injure, damage or destroy property of the United Nations, you must also find that he did so unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully, and I have already defined the meaning of those

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terms.

The final count of the indictment, Count 4, reads as follows:

"The Grand Jury charges:

"On or about the 5th day of August, 1974, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, Michael Halsey Brown, the defendant, unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did transport in interstate commerce an explosive with the knowledge or intent that it would be used to kill, injure or intimidate one or more individuals or destroy a building, vehicle or other real or personal property."

Before you can find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in this count, you must be convinced that the government has proved the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

- 1. That on or about August 5, 1974, the defendant transported certain objects or materials in interstate commerce.
- 2. That such objects or materials constituted explosives.
- 3. That such objects or materials were transported with the knowledge or intent that they be used either
  to kill or injure or intimidate one or more individuals or
  with the intent that they be used to destroy a building or
  other real or personal property.

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4. That the defendant acted unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully.

The first element of the offense charged here is that the defendant transported certain objects or materials in interstate commerce. To transport anything in interstate commerce simply means to carry it across state lines. Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant brought dynamite from Kentucky to New York, the government has met its burden of establishing that such dynamite was transported in interstate commerce.

If you find the requisite interstate transportation of the object or materials, you must next find that such object or materials transported in interstate commerce constituted an explosive.

I charge you as a matter of law that dynamite is an explosive within the meaning of the statute. You must nevertheless find beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance which the defendant is charged with transporting in interstate commerce was in fact dynamite. If you do so find, then the government has satisfied its burden of proof on this element of the offense.

Even if you find that the defendant transported explosives in interstate commerce, this is not sufficient for finding a violation of the statute. You must also find

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that the government has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he transported the explosives with the knowledge or intent that they be used to kill, injure or intimidate one or more individuals, or with the knowledge or intent that they be used to destroy a building, vehicle or other property.

I have already discussed with you what is meant by the term "intent." It necessarily involves a question as to what is in a person's mind.

Again I remind you that it is not always possible to determine directly what's in a person's mind. It is often necessary to infer intent from a person's acts, statements and from all the surrounding circumstances.

I instruct you that the statute in question here requires only that the government prove that the defendant intended any one of the following acts: to kill or to injure or to intimidate one or more individuals or to destroy property.

I have already defined some of these terms, namely, to injure and to destroy.

The term "kill" has its common, everyday meaning. Count 4, in addition, charges the crime of intending to intimidate one or more individuals through

the use of explosives. "Intimidate" simply means to

I remind you that the crimes with which the defendant is charged are conspiracy and attempts. He is not charged with actually committing any acts of violence

or destruction.

across state lines with the intent of frightening or intimidating persons at the United Nations, that is sufficient to find him guilty under the statute. On the other hand, if you find that while the defendant transported explosives in interstate commerce he did not do so with the knowledge or intention that it would be used to kill, injure or intimidate one or more individuals or destroy a building, vehicle or other real or personal property, then you must return a verdict of not guilty on Count 4.

frighten or inspire fear. Therefore, if you find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant transported explosives

Finally, before you may find the defendant guilty of Count 4, you must find that the government has shown that the defendant acted unlawfully, knowingly and wilfully as I have described or defined those terms to you.

The defendant's counsel has argued that because the dynamite placed in the United Nations lacked a blasting cap that it could never have detonated and thus the crimes charged could never have been committed.

I instruct you that should you find that the

dynamite was unlikely to explode given the manner of assembly and the means exployed, according to the government, to detonate it, this is no defense to any of the crimes charged.

Well, I have described the charges contained in each of the four counts in the indictment. I have outlined the essential elements of those counts. You should note that a separate crime or offense is charged in each of the four counts of the indictment. Each charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you find the accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as to the other offenses charged.

Also, you are not to consider in any way or speculate about the sentence which a defendant may receive if found guilty. It is the function of the jury to deliberate and determine whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty on the basis of the evidence and the instructions of the Court, and it is the function of the judge to determine the disposition of the defendant's case thereafter.

The most important part of the case is the part which you now as jurors are about to play, because it is you who will have to decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the counts charged.

I know you will try the issues that have been

presented to you according to the oath which you have taken as jurors. Now, in that oath you promised that you would well and truly try the issues joined in this case and a true verdict render. If you follow that oath and try the issues without confusing your thinking with emotions, you will arrive at a just verdict.

As you deliberate, please be careful to listen to the opinions of other jurors as well as to ask for an opportunity to express your views. No one juror holds the center of the stage in the jury room. No one juror controls or monopolizes deliberations. You must all express your views and exchange views. If you become convinced that your original view was wrong with respect to any matter, don't be afraid to change your vote because of pride in your original opinion or in reaction to the stubbornness of another person. On the other hand, do not surrender your honest belief solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or because you are outnumbered.

Now, you understand that in a criminal case in this court your verdict on each count must be unanimous, that is, it must be joined in by each and every one of you.

The form of your verdict will be either guilty or not guilty on each count of the indictment that is before you.

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During your deliberations, you may send for any exhibits in evidence that you may desire to review. You may request that any testimony be read back to you. You may request any portion of this charge to be read back to you.

Once you are directed to begin your deliberations, the Court will send in a copy of the indictment for your information. Please remember that it is merely an accusation, it is not evidence. It is simply sent in to aid you understanding what the charges are.

Any request which you make should be made in writing. You should not discuss this case with anyone from this point forward except through the medium of writing directed to the Court. Your deliberations must be limited to the jury room. You mustn't discuss the case outside the jury room. You mustn't deliberate outside the jury room.

You must nor reveal the standing of the jurors at any time during your deliberations, that is, you are not to indicate the split of any vote on any count for any verdict to anyone, including the Court.

Now, Madam Forelady, lead the jury out for a few moments and then I will call you right back in. Don't talk about the case yet. You have not been directed to

deliberate.

(Jury leaves courtroom.)

THE COURT: All right, I will take any objections.

MR. HANES: Your Honor, in behalf of the defendant, we would respectfully object to that part of the
Court's charge on Count 2 regarding the definition of the
words "offer violence" as in essence to threaten violence
or create unusual physical danger, I believe.

The defendant's contention is that "offer violence" in the context of that statute requires a communicated offer of violence.

THE COURT: Do I take it that you do not have a specific proposed substitute to offer? Is that not so?

MR. HANES: Your Honor, what I was doing was remaking the same objections that we argued yesterday, I believe.

THE COURT: I understand that. I think for the purposes of making the record clear I have to ask you if you wish to present to me an alternative to be presented to the jury.

MR. HANES: Your Honor, in essence, I would offer to the Court that the definition of "offer violence" as given by the Court have the following words added to the end of that sentence which says: "To threaten violence or

SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE .

GW51

create unusual physical danger and such threat or physical danger must be communicated to or made known to a foreign official or official guest."

THE COURT: I suppose you continue to oppose that, Mr. Schaffer?

> MR. SCHAFFER: I do.

THE COURT: The Court declines to give that additional instruction.

What further objections?

MR. HANES: That is all for the defendant.

THE COURT: From the government?

MR. SCHAFFER: One brief note, your Honor, and I may not have heard accurately.

Did the Court instruct the jury that they may convict on the conspiracy count if they find that any one of the objectives -- that any one of the stated purposes was proved? In other words, they need not find that the conspiracy had all three purposes but need only find the conspiracy had one of the three purposes.

THE COURT: Let me check.

MR. HANES: Do you mean overt acts?

MR. SCHAFFER: The conspiracy had as its object the violation of any one or more of the three statutes charged as the objective of the conspiracy.

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THE COURT: Apparently I have not charged that. Let me just finish this to make sure.

MR. HANES: Your Honor, did I understand the Court to say you are going to supplement your charge?

THE COURT: I have not done it and I think it is a proper request.

MR. HANES: Your Honor, we would object to that on the ground that to supplement your charge at this time on that point adds undue emphasis to that point in that count, that the alternative as stated in the indictment is sufficient and as read to the jury is sufficient to raise that issue and show the alternatives.

THE COURT: Your objection is noted and overruled.
Anything further?

(No response.)

THE COURT: Bring them back in.

MR. SCHAFFER: There is some proposed language to the general effect that my comment was addressed to in the government's request number two, page two.

THE COURT: That may be helpful. Request two?

MR. SCHAFFER: Request two, page two, under the heading "Second."

THE COURT: How is that going to be helpful, Mr. Schaffer?

| GW5

MR. SCHAFFER: Only insofar as it says, your Honor, that --

THE COURT: One or more?

MR. SCHAFFER: Yes. It wasn't a verbatim text but only a suggestion that it might be helpful to consider portions of that.

THE COURT: Thank you. Bring the jury in.

MR. HANES: Your Honor, in that context, what is the Court's policy and practice with regard to sequestration of the jury during deliberation?

THE COURT: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Mr. Hanes, the policy generally in this district is that we do not sequester juries normally, so that if they are still deliberating when we get to the end of a particular day, we tend to send them home with an instruction.

MR. HANES: Will they be sequestered for the rest of this day?

THE COURT: Yes. They will be sequestered up to the dinner hour, and then I will take under consideration how long they have been at it and whether or not we ought to let them go out for some air and for dinner. We will see.

MR. HANES: We request that they be kept together during their deliberations.

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THE COURT: We will see.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Let the record show that the government has furnished a clean copy of the superseding indictment. It has been shown to Mr. Hanes and the Court intends to send it in via the marshal once the jury has returned to begin their deliberations.

(Jury enters courtroom.)

THE COURT: Now just one additional matter.

I told you earlier that the indictment here charges that the conspiracy had as its object the violation of Sections 112(a), 970 and 844(d) of Title 18 of the United States Code. Thus, the government must prove that it was the purpose of the conspiracy to violate these federal statutes.

I correct that. You need not find that it was the object of the conspiracy to violate each of these federal statutes. It is sufficient if you find there was a conspiracy to violate one or more of them, that is, that the object of the conspiracy was to violate one or more of those federal statutes.

Now, with that I now instruct you that the time has come for you to begin to deliberate, and please follow the instructions I have already given you.

room.

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Madam Forelady, lead the jury back to the jury

Alternate jurors please remain in your seats.

Swear the marshals.

(Marshal sworn.)

THE COURT: All right, Marshal, lead them in.

Take a copy of the indictment and hand it to them once

they are in the room.

(At 12:05 P. M., the jury retired to commence

their deliberations.)

10/14 Collows

[Hay 3, 1974]

Dear Jim:

Was just thinking about you the other day. I'm in need of a dirty old man. Seriously, here's what I need. Send this creep every peice of pornography and smutty newspaper you can get your hands on and put him on every vile mailing list you can think of (wrapped so his co-workers can see what it is when they open the P.O. Box):

Harold E. Selman

P.O. Box 1706

Louisville, Kentucky 40201

I haven't been able to get his home address yet but this should do for openers.


I don't deal in drugs. I abandoned the dynamite idea when I found the extent Big Brother keeps tabs on you after you learn how to use it. I'm studying chemistry and will cook my own if I need it.

Here's another little project for you (a practical joke on Noah): write to Jack Fredericks Delmar Route Box 98 Harrison Arkansas (he's Noah) and tell him you're a girl who went for a ride on the back of his knucklehead chopper in early 1970, got pregnant and had his kid, and you and junior are coming down to meet him as soon as possible (say he picked you up hitchhiking in Hollywood). Tell him you had a hard time tracking him and are living with your parents in Chicago (say you were age 14 when he picked you up). He'll get a real kick out of it. Use a street return address if possible.

Ever see that movie "The Sting"? I've got a similar project going I've named Operation Tuna Fish" that seems to be working quite well. If I knew more about this joker in Caklawn I might be able to work a similar scam on him (for a percentage).

300-man ride coming up this month. Give me a blast if interested.

Chest Wishes.



Dynamite in sling

Members of the New York City bomb squad use a sling between two long poles as they carry five sticks of dynamite from the United Nations Wadnesday. The explosives were found in the

U.N. meditation room located in the General Assembly, low building at left. The city police deactivated the dynamite without incident. (UPI Photo)

## Explosives planted in U.N. room

NEW YORK (UPI) — Five sticks of fused dynamite with a "30-yard killing radius" were found lying next to a cigarette and book of matches Wednesday in the United Nations Meditation Room. The explosives were removed by a city bomb squad without incident.

It was the first time in the history of the United Nations that a bomb was actually planted in the New York headquarters, although many bomb threats have been received and two fake bombs once were discovered in the washrooms of the visitor's section.

U.N. security guards

found the dynamite in a brown paper bag planted beneath a bench in the Meditation Room in the General Assembly building when the room, where delegates often stop to pray before beginning work, was opened for the day.

A U.N. official said no calls were made alerting them to the existence of the bornb. The official said the dynamite was probably planted Tuesday night "just to prove that a bornb could be planted."

City Bomb Squad officer Charles Wells said the dynamite was "60 per cent gelatin and could have caused considerable damage if it had exploded. It probably would have had about a 30-yard killing radius."

Officials said a book of matches and an unlit cigarette were found lying near the fuse.

## Bangladesh flood toll exceeds 800

DACCA, Bangladesh (AP) — The official death toll rose to more than 800 Wednesday as heavy flooding brought fresh death and devastation to Bangladesh.

Deaths were reported in

Best 4479 1 7% ... Coast SC Gs 3 252 7 + 1/2 DVMO IN:20 5 26 10/6+ % GaPwol7.72 ... 10 74 ... 10 hp...

## Certificate of Service

10/10.19.75

I certify that a copy of this brief and appendix has been mailed to the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.

2/1/1947